FIRST SECTION

CASE OF GLOR v. SWITZERLAND
(Appli­ca­ti­on no. 13444/04)

JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG

30 April 2009

FINAL

06/11/2009

This judgment has become final under Artic­le 44 § 2 of the Con­ven­ti­on.

In the case of Glor v. Switz­er­land,
The Euro­pean Court of Human Rights (First Sec­tion), sit­ting as a Cham­ber com­po­sed of:
N, Pre­si­dent,
A,
E,
K,
S,
G,
G,
and André Wam­pach, Deputy Sec­tion Regis­trar,
Having deli­be­ra­ted in pri­va­te on 7 April 2009,
Deli­vers the fol­lo­wing judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case ori­gi­na­ted in an appli­ca­ti­on (no. 13444/04) against the Swiss Con­fe­de­ra­ti­on lodged with the Court under Artic­le 34 of the Con­ven­ti­on for the Pro­tec­tion of Human Rights and Fun­da­men­tal Free­doms (“the Con­ven­ti­on”) by a Swiss natio­nal, Mr Sven Glor (“the appli­cant”), on 22 March 2004.
2. The appli­cant, who had been gran­ted legal aid, was repre­sen­ted by Ms D. von Planta-Sting, a lawyer prac­ti­sing in Zürich. The Swiss Govern­ment (“the Govern­ment”) were repre­sen­ted by their Agent, initi­al­ly Mr H. K, Direc­tor, Fede­ral Office of Jus­ti­ce, then Mr F. S Head of the Human Rights and Coun­cil of Europe Sec­tion, Fede­ral Office of Jus­ti­ce, and their Deputy Agent, Mr A. Scheid­eg­ger.
3. The appli­cant com­plai­ned that he had been requi­red to pay a tax in order to be exempt­ed from com­pul­so­ry mili­ta­ry ser­vice despi­te the fact that he had been wil­ling to do any form of natio­nal ser­vice, mili­ta­ry or other­wi­se, com­pa­ti­ble with his minor disa­bi­li­ty. He alle­ged that the Swiss aut­ho­ri­ties’ prac­ti­ce in the matter lacked a legal basis and amoun­ted to dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on within the mea­ning of Artic­le 14 of the Con­ven­ti­on.
4. The appli­ca­ti­on was allo­ca­ted to the Fourth Sec­tion of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Sec­tion, the Cham­ber that would con­sider the case (Artic­le 27 § 1 of the Con­ven­ti­on) was con­sti­tu­ted as pro­vi­ded in Rule 26 § 1.
5. On 1 Sep­tem­ber 2005 the Court deci­ded to give notice of the appli­ca­ti­on to the Govern­ment and to invite the par­ties to submit obser­va­tions on the admis­si­bi­li­ty and merits of the com­plaint of dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on. It was also deci­ded to rule on the admis­si­bi­li­ty and merits of the appli­ca­ti­on at the same time (Artic­le 29 § 3 of the Con­ven­ti­on).
6. On 1 April 2006 the appli­ca­ti­on was allo­ca­ted to the newly con­sti­tu­ted Fifth Sec­tion of the Court (Rules 25 § 5 and 52 § 1).
7. On 19 Janu­ary 2007 the appli­ca­ti­on was allo­ca­ted to the First Sec­tion (Rules 25 § 5 and 52 § 1).
8. On 6 Novem­ber 2007 and 8 Janu­ary 2008 the Court recei­ved addi­tio­nal obser­va­tions from the par­ties.
9. On 6 May 2008 the Court deci­ded to give notice of the appli­ca­ti­on to the Govern­ment again and to invite the par­ties to submit addi­tio­nal obser­va­tions on the admis­si­bi­li­ty and merits of the com­plaint of dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on. On 23 June and 3 Octo­ber 2008 it recei­ved the par­ties’ obser­va­tions.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
10. The appli­cant was born in 1978 and lives in Däl­li­kon (Canton of Zürich). By his own account, he is a lorry driver.
11. On 14 March 1997 a mili­ta­ry doctor declared him unfit for mili­ta­ry ser­vice as he was suf­fe­ring from type 1 dia­be­tes (dia­be­tes mel­li­tus).
12. On 22 Febru­ary 1999 the appli­cant was also exempt­ed from the civil pro­tec­tion ser­vice.
13. On 8 Sep­tem­ber 2000 that exemp­ti­on was lifted and in Octo­ber that year the appli­cant was assi­gned to the Düben­dorf Civil Pro­tec­tion Reser­ve in the Canton of Zürich. Accor­ding to the Govern­ment, it is unclear from the file whe­ther the appli­cant was given any tasks to carry out in a civil pro­tec­tion capa­ci­ty. The appli­cant alleges that he vol­un­tee­red on seve­ral occa­si­ons, but becau­se of staff cut­backs in the Canton of Zürich he was never called to do any civil pro­tec­tion duty.
14. On 9 August 2001 the Zürich can­to­nal aut­ho­ri­ties respon­si­ble for the mili­ta­ry-ser­vice exemp­ti­on tax sent him an order to pay the tax for 2000, in the amount of 716 Swiss francs (CHF) (appro­xi­m­ate­ly 477 euros (EUR)), based on his taxa­ble income that year (CHF 35,800 – appro­xi­m­ate­ly EUR 23,866).
15. In a letter of 11 Sep­tem­ber 2001, the appli­cant chal­len­ged the tax demand, con­side­ring that he was being dis­cri­mi­na­ted against. He poin­ted out that he had always stated his rea­di­ness to do mili­ta­ry ser­vice.
16. On 20 Sep­tem­ber 2001 the fede­ral tax aut­ho­ri­ties infor­med the appli­cant that all Swiss men who did not suffer from a “major” disa­bi­li­ty were requi­red to pay a tax in order to be exempt­ed from mili­ta­ry ser­vice. They explai­ned that a disa­bi­li­ty was con­side­red “major” if the degree of phy­si­cal or mental disa­bi­li­ty was at least 40%. They con­side­red that fur­ther exami­na­ti­ons were needed in order to deter­mi­ne whe­ther the applicant’s disa­bi­li­ty met that requi­re­ment.
17. When he exami­ned the appli­cant on 14 May 2002, a doctor from the Zürich Uni­ver­si­ty Hos­pi­tal found that in most cases the type of dia­be­tes the appli­cant suf­fe­r­ed from did not make people unfit for work.
18. In ano­ther expert medi­cal exami­na­ti­on on 5 May 2003, a mili­ta­ry doctor found the applicant’s phy­si­cal disa­bi­li­ty to be less than 40%.
19. By a decis­i­on of 15 July 2003, the Zürich can­to­nal aut­ho­ri­ties respon­si­ble for the mili­ta­ry-ser­vice exemp­ti­on tax deci­ded, based on the fin­dings of the medi­cal exami­na­ti­on and the expert exami­na­ti­on of 14 May 2002, that the appli­cant did not qua­li­fy for exemp­ti­on from the tax as his degree of inva­li­di­ty was less than 40%. The appli­cant chal­len­ged that decis­i­on and the aut­ho­ri­ties con­firm­ed it on 5 August 2003.
20. The Fede­ral Tax Appeals Board for the Canton of Zürich upheld that decis­i­on on 7 Novem­ber 2003. It con­side­red that in adop­ting the cri­te­ria set out in sec­tion 4(1)(a) of the Fede­ral Mili­ta­ry-Ser­vice Exemp­ti­on Tax Act of 12 June 1959 (see “Rele­vant dome­stic law and prac­ti­ce”, para­graph 30 below) Parliament’s inten­ti­on had not been to gene­ral­ly exempt all people with disa­bi­li­ties from the obli­ga­ti­on to pay the tax in ques­ti­on. In the applicant’s case the medi­cal exami­na­ti­on of 14 May 2002 had shown that his disa­bi­li­ty was not a major one and that his con­di­ti­on was highly unli­kely to be an obs­ta­cle in his future career. Thanks to medi­cal pro­gress, pati­ents with the applicant’s type of dia­be­tes could live quite normal lives these days and prac­ti­se almost any line of work. That being so, the people con­cer­ned were not con­side­red to have disa­bi­li­ties for the pur­po­ses of sec­tion 4(1)(a) of the Fede­ral Mili­ta­ry-Ser­vice Exemp­ti­on Tax Act. The Board fur­ther found that the appli­cant had failed to demons­tra­te that his con­di­ti­on, and in par­ti­cu­lar the need to admi­nis­ter hims­elf four insu­lin injec­tions a day, pre­ven­ted him from working. Lastly, the Board did not con­sider that the distinc­tion bet­ween major disa­bi­li­ties and other types of disa­bi­li­ty amoun­ted, as the appli­cant alle­ged, to dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on.
21. On 19 Decem­ber 2003 the appli­cant filed an admi­nis­tra­ti­ve com­plaint with the Fede­ral Court. He clai­med, in par­ti­cu­lar, that he was a victim of dis­cri­mi­na­to­ry tre­at­ment in so far as, on the one hand, he had been requi­red to pay the exemp­ti­on tax and, on the other, he had not been allo­wed to do his mili­ta­ry ser­vice even though he had always stated his rea­di­ness to do it.
22. On 5 Febru­ary 2004, when invi­ted by the Fede­ral Court to submit obser­va­tions on the admis­si­bi­li­ty and merits of the com­plaint, the fede­ral tax aut­ho­ri­ties recom­men­ded its rejec­tion.
23. In a judgment of 9 March 2004, the Fede­ral Court rejec­ted the com­plaint. Based on the fin­dings of the expert exami­na­ti­on of 14 May 2002, it held that the appli­cant did not have a major phy­si­cal or mental disa­bi­li­ty within the mea­ning of sec­tion 4(1)(a) of the Fede­ral Mili­ta­ry-Ser­vice Exemp­ti­on Tax Act. Accor­din­gly, he did not qua­li­fy for exemp­ti­on from the tax. The Fede­ral Court also poin­ted out that alt­hough the medi­cal exami­na­ti­on showed that the type of dia­be­tes the appli­cant had was unli­kely to pre­vent him from hol­ding a normal job, the par­ti­cu­lar cons­traints of mili­ta­ry ser­vice nevert­hel­ess obli­ged the aut­ho­ri­ties to decla­re him unfit.
24. The Fede­ral Court explai­ned that the aim of the law was to pro­vi­de a system of com­pen­sa­ti­on bet­ween those citi­zens who did their mili­ta­ry ser­vice and those who were exempt­ed from it for wha­te­ver reason. The tax in issue was meant to replace the effort and incon­ve­ni­ence of mili­ta­ry ser­vice. As to the com­plaint of dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on, the court explai­ned that it was for reasons of equa­li­ty that the law did not pro­vi­de for a blan­ket exemp­ti­on for all people with disa­bi­li­ties.
25. The Fede­ral Court con­side­red that the can­to­nal aut­ho­ri­ties had merely cor­rect­ly appli­ed the law and that it was not the court’s role to change the law.
26. It also held that the fact that the appli­cant had always declared his wil­ling­ness to do mili­ta­ry ser­vice and felt fit to do it as a pro­fes­sio­nal driver did not make any dif­fe­rence, as the law pro­vi­ded for no alter­na­ti­ve for someone in his situa­ti­on but to pay the exemp­ti­on tax.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Dome­stic law and prac­ti­ce
1. The obli­ga­ti­on to serve and the exemp­ti­on tax in Swiss law
27. Artic­le 59 § 1 of the Fede­ral Con­sti­tu­ti­on pro­vi­des the foun­da­ti­on for com­pul­so­ry mili­ta­ry ser­vice in Switz­er­land. It reads as fol­lows:
Artic­le 59: Mili­ta­ry ser­vice and sub­sti­tu­te ser­vice
“1. All men of Swiss natio­na­li­ty shall do mili­ta­ry ser­vice. The law pro­vi­des for sub­sti­tu­te civi­li­an ser­vice.
2. Swiss women may serve in the army on a vol­un­t­a­ry basis.
3. All men of Swiss natio­na­li­ty who do not do mili­ta­ry ser­vice or sub­sti­tu­te civi­li­an ser­vice shall pay a tax. The tax shall be paid to the Con­fe­de­ra­ti­on and fixed and levied by the can­tons.
…”
28. Con­scripts go to a trai­ning school for 18 to 21 weeks at the age of 19 or 20, fol­lo­wed by six or seven 19-day refres­her cour­ses stag­ge­red over seve­ral years. It is also pos­si­ble to do the full 300 days’ ser­vice in one unin­ter­rupt­ed stretch. Under sec­tion 42 of the Fede­ral Army and Mili­ta­ry Admi­nis­tra­ti­on Act of 3 Febru­ary 1995, ordi­na­ry ser­vice­men must do 330 days’ trai­ning. For ordi­na­ry ser­vice­men and non-com­mis­sio­ned offi­cers, mili­ta­ry-ser­vice obli­ga­ti­ons end at the end of the year of their 30th bir­th­day or, if they have not com­ple­ted their full trai­ning time, at the end of the year during which they reach the age of 34 (sec­tion 13(2)(a) of the same Act).
29. The Fede­ral Mili­ta­ry-Ser­vice Exemp­ti­on Tax Act of 12 June 1959 impo­ses a tax on those who do not do all or part of their mili­ta­ry ser­vice. Sec­tion 2 of the Act iden­ti­fies the per­sons sub­ject to the tax:
Sec­tion 2: Per­sons sub­ject to the tax
“The per­sons sub­ject to the tax are men, resi­dent in Switz­er­land or abroad, who are eli­gi­ble for ser­vice and who, in the course of a calen­dar year (the year in which the tax is appli­ca­ble):
(a) for more than six months are not incor­po­ra­ted into an army corps or called upon to do civi­li­an ser­vice;

© do not do the mili­ta­ry or civi­li­an ser­vice requi­red of them as men eli­gi­ble for ser­vice.
The tax shall not be levied on any man who, in the course of the year in which the tax is appli­ca­ble, effec­tively did mili­ta­ry ser­vice, even though he was not con­script­ed for the whole year …”
30. Sec­tion 4 of the same Act lists the cate­go­ries of people who are exo­ne­ra­ted from paying the tax:
Sec­tion 4: Exo­ne­ra­ti­on from the tax
“Shall be exo­ne­ra­ted from the tax those per­sons who, in the course of the year in which the tax is appli­ca­ble:
(a) becau­se of a major phy­si­cal or mental disa­bi­li­ty, have a taxa­ble income which, after deduc­tion of the insu­rance bene­fits men­tio­ned in sec­tion 12(1)©, and of the cost of sup­port made neces­sa­ry by the disa­bi­li­ty, does not exceed by more than 100% the mini­mum sub­sis­tence income for the pur­po­ses of debt reco­very law;
(a) bis are con­side­red unfit for mili­ta­ry ser­vice becau­se of a major disa­bi­li­ty and recei­ve a disa­bi­li­ty bene­fit or allo­wan­ce from the fede­ral disa­bi­li­ty insu­rance or acci­dent insu­rance scheme;
(a) ter are con­side­red unfit for mili­ta­ry ser­vice becau­se of a major disa­bi­li­ty and do not recei­ve a disa­bi­li­ty bene­fit or allo­wan­ce, but meet one of the two mini­mum requi­re­ments to qua­li­fy for such an allo­wan­ce;

(d) have rea­ched the age-limit at which ordi­na­ry ser­vice­men and non-com­mis­sio­ned offi­cers, except higher-ran­king non-com­mis­sio­ned offi­cers, are released from their mili­ta­ry obli­ga­ti­ons;
…”
31. This last pro­vi­si­on indi­ca­tes that the obli­ga­ti­on to pay the tax lasts until the year in which the person con­cer­ned rea­ches the age-limit at which ordi­na­ry ser­vice­men and cer­tain non-com­mis­sio­ned offi­cers are freed from mili­ta­ry obli­ga­ti­ons, that is to say from the age of 19 or 20 to the end of the year of their 30th bir­th­day (accor­ding to the appli­cant, under sec­tion 13 of the Fede­ral Army and Mili­ta­ry Admi­nis­tra­ti­on Act he would be sub­ject to the tax until the age of 34; see para­graph 28 above).
32. Under the legis­la­ti­on gover­ning direct fede­ral taxes, the mili­ta­ry-ser­vice exemp­ti­on tax is levied on the person’s total net income. As a result, for a bache­lor the income on which the exemp­ti­on tax is based is the taxa­ble income under the law gover­ning direct fede­ral taxes. The exemp­ti­on tax is 2% of that income (but no less than CHF 200). Accor­ding to the Govern­ment that method of cal­cu­la­ting the tax has the advan­ta­ge of spa­ring the person con­cer­ned the trou­ble of fil­ling in an addi­tio­nal tax decla­ra­ti­on for the exemp­ti­on tax.
33. In its ear­lier wor­ding the cri­ter­ion adopted in sec­tion 1(1) of the order of 30 August 1995 on the mili­ta­ry-ser­vice exemp­ti­on tax to deter­mi­ne whe­ther a disa­bi­li­ty should be con­side­red “major” for the pur­po­ses of the Fede­ral Mili­ta­ry-Ser­vice Exemp­ti­on Tax Act was the degree of disa­bi­li­ty used for disa­bi­li­ty insu­rance. Howe­ver, in a judgment of 27 Febru­ary 1998 (ATF 124 II 241), the Fede­ral Court explai­ned that the notion of “major” phy­si­cal or mental of disa­bi­li­ty within the mea­ning of sec­tion 4(1)(a) of the Fede­ral Mili­ta­ry-Ser­vice Exemp­ti­on Tax Act should be unders­tood in the medi­cal sense, not the disa­bi­li­ty insu­rance sense. Ruling on the merits of the case, it held that the disa­bi­li­ty caused by ampu­ta­ti­on of the leg at the knee was a “major” disa­bi­li­ty, cor­re­spon­ding to 40% on the disa­bi­li­ty scale (Appen­dix 3 to the order of 20 Decem­ber 1982 on acci­dent insu­rance).
34. In a judgment of 22 June 2000 (Archiv für Schwei­ze­ri­sches Abga­be­recht 69, p. 668), the Fede­ral Court deci­ded that in order to deter­mi­ne whe­ther a disa­bi­li­ty was “major” for the pur­po­ses of exemp­ti­on from the tax, what should be taken into con­side­ra­ti­on were the tables used by the Swiss Natio­nal Insu­rance Fund in the event of an acci­dent to cal­cu­la­te com­pen­sa­ti­on for bodily harm in accordance with the fede­ral law on acci­dent insu­rance. The court also con­side­red that the aut­ho­ri­ties could base their decis­i­on on the fede­ral tax aut­ho­ri­ties’ “Ins­truc­tions con­cer­ning exo­ne­ra­ti­on from the tax becau­se of a major phy­si­cal, mental or psy­cho­lo­gi­cal disa­bi­li­ty”, which were based on those tables and could be con­side­red to have the value of a pre­sump­ti­on of law in so far as they were suf­fi­ci­ent­ly rele­vant to the par­ti­cu­lar case.
2. Sub­sti­tu­te ser­vice in Swiss law
35. Accor­ding to the par­ties there is no “alter­na­ti­ve” to mili­ta­ry ser­vice under Swiss law.
36. Civi­li­an ser­vice is a sub­sti­tu­te ser­vice for people eli­gi­ble for mili­ta­ry ser­vice who cannot recon­ci­le the obli­ga­ti­on to do mili­ta­ry ser­vice with their con­sci­ence. It is regu­la­ted by the Fede­ral Civi­li­an Ser­vice Act of 6 Octo­ber 1995. The formal con­di­ti­on for eli­gi­bi­li­ty for civi­li­an ser­vice is fit­ness for mili­ta­ry ser­vice.
37. Artic­le 61 of the Fede­ral Con­sti­tu­ti­on pro­vi­des sepa­ra­te regu­la­ti­ons gover­ning civil pro­tec­tion. The obli­ga­ti­on to do civil pro­tec­tion ser­vice is unre­la­ted to the obli­ga­ti­on to serve in the army, so mili­ta­ry ser­vice cannot be repla­ced by time spent in the civil pro­tec­tion ser­vice. Nor is there any pos­si­bi­li­ty of choo­sing bet­ween mili­ta­ry ser­vice and civil pro­tec­tion. On the other hand, all the trai­ning and work done in civil pro­tec­tion can be taken into account in the cal­cu­la­ti­on of the exemp­ti­on tax.
B. Inter­na­tio­nal law and prac­ti­ce
38. The Office of the United Nati­ons High Com­mis­sio­ner for Human Rights pre­sen­ted a report to the United Nati­ons Eco­no­mic and Social Coun­cil on best prac­ti­ces in rela­ti­on to con­sci­en­tious objec­tion to mili­ta­ry ser­vice, which descri­bed the wide range of sub­sti­tu­te ser­vices available (ECOSOC, Com­mis­si­on on Human Rights, Civil and Poli­ti­cal Rights, Inclu­ding the Ques­ti­on of Con­sci­en­tious Objec­tion to Mili­ta­ry Ser­vice, Doc. E/CN.4/2006/51, 27 Febru­ary 2006, available on the Inter­net). In this report the Office of the High Com­mis­sio­ner addres­sed the ques­ti­on of paying a tax ins­tead of doing mili­ta­ry ser­vice:
“53. An issue rela­ted to con­sci­en­tious objec­tor status, or more broad­ly exemp­ti­on from or a reduc­tion of com­pul­so­ry mili­ta­ry ser­vice for any reason, is the pay­ment of a spe­cial tax. Alt­hough this is not wide­spread, it has been repor­ted to occur in a number of count­ries. Switz­er­land, for exam­p­le, levies a tax on earned income for all male citi­zens who cannot per­form their com­pul­so­ry mili­ta­ry ser­vice for wha­te­ver reason. Other types of taxes rela­ting to exemp­ti­on or reduc­tion in the period of mili­ta­ry ser­vice have been repor­ted to occur or to have occur­red in count­ries such as Alba­nia, Ecua­dor, Geor­gia, Turkey and Uzbe­ki­stan.”
39. The non-govern­men­tal orga­ni­sa­ti­on Con­sci­ence and Peace Tax Inter­na­tio­nal, which has spe­cial con­sul­ta­ti­ve status with the United Nati­ons, sub­mit­ted obser­va­tions to the former Com­mis­si­on on Human Rights of the United Nati­ons Eco­no­mic and Social Coun­cil (ECOSOC, Com­mis­si­on on Human Rights, Writ­ten State­ment sub­mit­ted by Con­sci­ence and Peace Tax Inter­na­tio­nal, Doc. E/CN.4/2006/NGO/108, 18 Febru­ary 2006), in which it stated (p. 2):
“… a sur­pri­sing number of States con­ti­nue to accept finan­cial con­tri­bu­ti­ons in lieu of mili­ta­ry ser­vice. In Colom­bia, Ecua­dor, Boli­via and Switz­er­land all or most of those excu­sed mili­ta­ry ser­vice for wha­te­ver reason – inclu­ding those who are wil­ling but phy­si­cal­ly inca­pa­ble – are requi­red to pay a spe­cial mili­ta­ry tax. In other count­ries there is legal pro­vi­si­on that exemp­ti­on (Alba­nia, Geor­gia, Mon­go­lia) or (Iran, Uzbe­ki­stan) the com­mu­ta­ti­on of mili­ta­ry ser­vice to a brief period of trai­ning may be purcha­sed for cash …”
C. Sta­tis­ti­cal data con­cer­ning reduc­tions in the Swiss army and the exemp­ti­on tax
40. Staff reduc­tions in the army, in par­ti­cu­lar on the occa­si­on of the “Army 95” and “Army XXI” reforms, went hand in hand with a decrease in the length of mili­ta­ry ser­vice. When the “Army 95” reform was intro­du­ced the age by which com­pul­so­ry mili­ta­ry ser­vice had to be com­ple­ted was lowe­red from 50 to 42 years for most people, and that age was fur­ther lowe­red by the “Army XXI” reform to 30 or 34 years.
41. For the years 2001 and 2002 79.8% of the popu­la­ti­on eli­gi­ble for con­scrip­ti­on (56,380 out of 70,634 people) were found fit for mili­ta­ry ser­vice. During the sub­se­quent trai­ning school appro­xi­m­ate­ly 22% of those drop­ped out for medi­cal reasons, so about 58% of the eli­gi­ble popu­la­ti­on com­ple­ted the trai­ning.
42. In 2004 there were 27,766 con­scripts, 17,445 (62.8%) of whom were found fit for ser­vice; in 2005 con­scripts num­be­red 33,036, of whom 20,155 (61%) were found fit for ser­vice; and in 2006 24,134 out of 37,377 con­scripts (64.6%) were found fit for ser­vice. In 2004, 4,457 people (that is to say 16% of the people actual­ly con­script­ed that year and 10% of those found fit for mili­ta­ry ser­vice) were released from the obli­ga­ti­on to do mili­ta­ry ser­vice while in trai­ning school for medi­cal reasons (the cor­re­spon­ding figu­res for 2005 were 3,071 people or 9.3% and 5.7% respec­tively; and for 2006, 2,668 people or 9.3% and 6% respec­tively). Accor­ding to state­ments made to the press on 6 Janu­ary 2008 by Major Gene­ral Lupi, Sur­ge­on Gene­ral of the Swiss Army, 34% of con­scripts were declared unfit for mili­ta­ry ser­vice during the 2007 recruit­ment cam­paign and ano­ther 6% would very pro­ba­b­ly be declared unfit for mili­ta­ry ser­vice during or after trai­ning school (figu­res taken from the Neue Zür­cher Zei­tung of 7 Janu­ary 2008, p. 8).
43. Accor­ding to the Govern­ment, these figu­res show that in recent years bet­ween 52% and 58% of con­scripts com­ple­ted trai­ning school.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 8
A. Admis­si­bi­li­ty
44. The appli­cant clai­med that he was the victim of dis­cri­mi­na­to­ry tre­at­ment becau­se he was pre­ven­ted from doing his mili­ta­ry ser­vice alt­hough he was wil­ling to serve and, ins­tead, he was obli­ged to pay the exemp­ti­on tax becau­se his disa­bi­li­ty was con­side­red a minor one by the com­pe­tent aut­ho­ri­ties. This com­plaint must accor­din­gly be exami­ned under Artic­le 14 of the Con­ven­ti­on, which reads as fol­lows:
“The enjoy­ment of the rights and free­doms set forth in [the] Con­ven­ti­on shall be secu­red wit­hout dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on on any ground such as sex, race, colour, lan­guage, reli­gi­on, poli­ti­cal or other opi­ni­on, natio­nal or social origin, asso­cia­ti­on with a natio­nal mino­ri­ty, pro­per­ty, birth or other status.”
45. Accor­ding to the Court’s well-estab­lished case-law, Artic­le 14 com­ple­ments the other sub­stan­ti­ve pro­vi­si­ons of the Con­ven­ti­on and its Pro­to­cols. It has no inde­pen­dent exis­tence since it has effect solely in rela­ti­on to the “enjoy­ment of the rights and free­doms” safe­guard­ed by those pro­vi­si­ons. Alt­hough the appli­ca­ti­on of Artic­le 14 does not neces­s­a­ri­ly pre­sup­po­se a breach of those pro­vi­si­ons – and to this extent it is auto­no­mous – there can be no room for its appli­ca­ti­on unless the facts in issue fall within the ambit of one of the latter pro­vi­si­ons (see, for exam­p­le, Abdu­la­ziz, Caba­les and Balkan­da­li v. the United King­dom, 28 May 1985, § 71, Series A no. 94).
46. The Court has said on many occa­si­ons that Artic­le 14 comes into play when­ever “the sub­ject matter of the dis­ad­van­ta­ge … con­sti­tu­tes one of the moda­li­ties of the exer­cise of a right gua­ran­teed” (see Natio­nal Union of Bel­gi­an Police v. Bel­gi­um, 27 Octo­ber 1975, § 45, Series A no. 19), or the mea­su­res com­plai­ned of are “linked to the exer­cise of a right gua­ran­teed” (see Schmidt and Dah­l­ström v. Sweden, 6 Febru­ary 1976, § 39, Series A no. 21).
47. In that con­nec­tion, the Court is aware that the appli­cant, who was not repre­sen­ted by coun­sel before the dome­stic aut­ho­ri­ties, did not expli­cit­ly rely on any other sub­stan­ti­ve pro­vi­si­on of the Con­ven­ti­on or its Pro­to­cols.
48. Howe­ver, since it is master of the cha­rac­te­ri­sa­ti­on to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Guerra and Others v. Italy, 19 Febru­ary 1998, § 44, Reports of Judgments and Decis­i­ons 1998 I), the Court con­siders it appro­pria­te to exami­ne whe­ther the mili­ta­ry-ser­vice exemp­ti­on tax falls within the ambit of Artic­le 8 of the Con­ven­ti­on, which reads as fol­lows:
“1. Ever­yo­ne has the right to respect for his pri­va­te and family life, his home and his cor­re­spon­dence.
2. There shall be no inter­fe­rence by a public aut­ho­ri­ty with the exer­cise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is neces­sa­ry in a demo­cra­tic socie­ty in the inte­rests of natio­nal secu­ri­ty, public safety or the eco­no­mic well-being of the coun­try, for the pre­ven­ti­on of dis­or­der or crime, for the pro­tec­tion of health or morals, or for the pro­tec­tion of the rights and free­doms of others.”
1. The par­ties’ sub­mis­si­ons on the admis­si­bi­li­ty of the case
49. The Govern­ment argued that the appli­cant suf­fe­r­ed not from a disa­bi­li­ty but from an ill­ness. His health was not serious­ly affec­ted and his per­so­nal deve­lo­p­ment and phy­si­cal and mental inte­gri­ty had not been impai­red by the mea­su­re in issue, namely the pay­ment of the exemp­ti­on tax. The Govern­ment admit­ted, on the other hand, that his medi­cal con­di­ti­on should not be unde­re­sti­ma­ted and that it requi­red per­ma­nent super­vi­si­on and regu­lar the­ra­peu­tic mea­su­res, such as insu­lin injec­tions seve­ral times a day. Howe­ver, the purely finan­cial dis­ad­van­ta­ge suf­fe­r­ed, which in this case had been tail­o­red to his finan­cial means, had not adver­se­ly affec­ted the applicant’s pri­va­te life. In fact, there was no direct link bet­ween the mea­su­re con­cer­ned and the applicant’s pri­va­te life. The Govern­ment accor­din­gly sub­mit­ted that Artic­le 8 was not appli­ca­ble and that the appli­ca­ti­on should be rejec­ted as incom­pa­ti­ble ratio­ne mate­riae with the Con­ven­ti­on, as Artic­le 14 had no inde­pen­dent exis­tence and could not be taken into account.
50. Fur­ther­mo­re, the Govern­ment con­side­red that the appli­cant had not raised the ques­ti­on of health-based dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on con­tra­ry to Artic­le 14 taken in con­junc­tion with Artic­le 8 before the dome­stic courts, or even before the Court. In par­ti­cu­lar, he had not demons­tra­ted to what extent his pri­va­te life had been affec­ted by the impug­ned decis­i­on. Nor had he shown how he had been dis­cri­mi­na­ted against in his pri­va­te life as a result of it. The Govern­ment accor­din­gly con­side­red that the appli­cant had not exhaus­ted the dome­stic reme­dies in respect of his com­plaint under Artic­le 14 of the Con­ven­ti­on taken in con­junc­tion with Artic­le 8.
51. The appli­cant main­tai­ned that the Govern­ment them­sel­ves had admit­ted that his health was affec­ted. He found it incom­pre­hen­si­ble, even con­tra­dic­to­ry, that the Govern­ment should arrive at the con­clu­si­on that such an ill­ness would have no impact on his per­so­nal deve­lo­p­ment and phy­si­cal inte­gri­ty. Howe­ver, in spite of his ill­ness, which alle­gedly made him unfit for mili­ta­ry or civi­li­an ser­vice, the appli­cant had had to pay the mili­ta­ry-ser­vice exemp­ti­on tax. In this way Swiss law sought to bene­fit from a medi­cal con­di­ti­on for which the appli­cant was not respon­si­ble. In his view such a mea­su­re cle­ar­ly inter­fe­red with his pri­va­te and family life. That being so, the appli­cant con­side­red that Artic­le 14 should be taken into account.
2. The Court’s assess­ment
52. The Court rei­te­ra­tes that the con­cept of “pri­va­te life” is a broad term not sus­cep­ti­ble to exhaus­ti­ve defi­ni­ti­on (see, for exam­p­le, Hadri-Vion­net v. Switz­er­land, no. 55525/00, § 51, 14 Febru­ary 2008, and Pretty v. the United King­dom, no. 2346/02, § 61, ECHR 2002 III). On seve­ral occa­si­ons the Court has admit­ted that pri­va­te life covers the phy­si­cal inte­gri­ty of the person (see, among other aut­ho­ri­ties, Cos­tel­lo-Roberts v. the United King­dom, 25 March 1993, § 36, Series A no. 247 C, and X and Y v. the Net­her­lands, 26 March 1985, § 22, Series A no. 91).
53. The Court also rei­te­ra­tes that the Con­ven­ti­on and its Pro­to­cols must be inter­pre­ted in the light of pre­sent-day con­di­ti­ons (see Marckx v. Bel­gi­um, 13 June 1979, § 41, Series A no. 31, and many sub­se­quent cases, such as Vo v. France [GC], no 53924/00, § 82, ECHR 2004-VIII, and Emonet and Others v. Switz­er­land, no. 39051/03, § 66, 13 Decem­ber 2007). It notes that the pre­sent case con­cerns pos­si­ble dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on against a person with a phy­si­cal disa­bi­li­ty, even though it is only con­side­red a minor disa­bi­li­ty by the dome­stic aut­ho­ri­ties. It also con­siders that there is a Euro­pean and world­wi­de con­sen­sus on the need to pro­tect people with disa­bi­li­ties from dis­cri­mi­na­to­ry tre­at­ment (see, for exam­p­le, Recom­men­da­ti­on 1592 (2003) towards full social inclu­si­on of people with disa­bi­li­ties, adopted by the Par­lia­men­ta­ry Assem­bly of the Coun­cil of Europe on 29 Janu­ary 2003, or the United Nati­ons Con­ven­ti­on on the Rights of Per­sons with Disa­bi­li­ties, which ente­red into force on 3 May 2008).
54. The Court con­siders that a tax coll­ec­ted by the State which has its origin, as in the pre­sent case, in unfit­ness to serve in the army for health reasons – that is, a factor out­side the person’s con­trol – cle­ar­ly falls within the scope of Artic­le 8 of the Con­ven­ti­on, even if the con­se­quen­ces of the mea­su­re are above all pecu­nia­ry (for cases con­cer­ning the “family” aspect of Artic­le 8, see, for exam­p­le, muta­tis mut­an­dis, Marckx, cited above, § 31; Pla and Pun­cer­n­au v. Andor­ra, no. 69498/01, § 55, ECHR 2004 VIII; Petro­vic v. Aus­tria, 27 March 1998, § 29, Reports 1998 II; and Merger and Cros v. France, no. 68864/01, § 46, 22 Decem­ber 2004; in this last case the Court declared that “family life” did not include only social, moral or cul­tu­ral rela­ti­ons, but also com­pri­sed inte­rests of a mate­ri­al kind).
55. In addi­ti­on, the Court rei­te­ra­ted the prin­ci­ple that the com­plaint to be sub­mit­ted to the Court must first have been made to the appro­pria­te natio­nal courts, at least in sub­s­tance, in accordance with the formal requi­re­ments of dome­stic law and within the pre­scri­bed time-limits (see Ankerl v. Switz­er­land, 23 Octo­ber 1996, § 34, Reports 1996 V). In the instant case it con­siders that the appli­cant did raise the sub­s­tance of the com­plaint of a vio­la­ti­on of Artic­le 14 taken in con­junc­tion with Artic­le 8 before the dome­stic aut­ho­ri­ties when he affirm­ed that he had been requi­red to pay the exemp­ti­on tax and pre­ven­ted from doing his mili­ta­ry ser­vice even though he had always main­tai­ned that he was wil­ling to do it. He had thus exhaus­ted the dome­stic reme­dies.
56. The Court notes that the com­plaint under Artic­le 14 of the Con­ven­ti­on taken in con­junc­tion with Artic­le 8 is not mani­fest­ly ill-foun­ded within the mea­ning of Artic­le 35 § 3 of the Con­ven­ti­on. It fur­ther notes that it is not inad­mis­si­ble on any other grounds. It must the­r­e­fo­re be declared admis­si­ble.
B. Merits
1. The par­ties’ sub­mis­si­ons
(a) The Govern­ment
57. The Govern­ment poin­ted out that the com­pe­tent aut­ho­ri­ties had con­side­red that it would have been objec­tively dan­ge­rous and irre­spon­si­ble to decla­re the appli­cant fit for mili­ta­ry ser­vice. That decis­i­on had been rea­ched based on his ill­ness and the spe­cial cons­traints linked to mili­ta­ry ser­vice, inclu­ding limi­t­ed access to health care and medi­ci­nes, strong phy­si­cal exer­ti­on and con­sidera­ble psy­cho­lo­gi­cal pres­su­re.
58. They also explai­ned that the pos­si­bi­li­ty of doing civi­li­an ser­vice ins­tead was rest­ric­ted solely to those who objec­ted to mili­ta­ry ser­vice on grounds of con­sci­ence.
59. Fur­ther­mo­re, the Govern­ment were con­vin­ced that the Fede­ral Mili­ta­ry-Ser­vice Exemp­ti­on Tax Act pur­sued a legi­ti­ma­te aim, which was to res­to­re a degree of equa­li­ty bet­ween those who actual­ly did mili­ta­ry or civi­li­an ser­vice and those who, for wha­te­ver reason, were exempt. The tax was meant to make up for the efforts and obli­ga­ti­ons which those exempt from ser­ving were spared.
60. In so far as the appli­cant argued that the distinc­tion made bet­ween people with dif­fe­rent degrees of disa­bi­li­ty was dis­cri­mi­na­to­ry, the Govern­ment poin­ted out that the legis­la­ti­on was framed so as to avoid exo­ne­ra­ting ever­yo­ne unfit for mili­ta­ry ser­vice becau­se of a disa­bi­li­ty from paying the tax, and to limit such exo­ne­ra­ti­on to those per­sons men­tio­ned in sec­tion 4 of the Fede­ral Mili­ta­ry-Ser­vice Exemp­ti­on Tax Act. Para­graph 1 (a) of sec­tion 4 laid down three con­di­ti­ons for a person unfit for mili­ta­ry ser­vice as a result of a disa­bi­li­ty to be exo­ne­ra­ted from the tax: a “major” disa­bi­li­ty; income that did not exceed the mini­mum sub­sis­tence income; and a causal link bet­ween that income and the disa­bi­li­ty. The pro­vi­si­on thus took into account the degree of phy­si­cal or mental disa­bi­li­ty of the person con­cer­ned as well as their finan­cial situa­ti­on. A gene­ral exemp­ti­on from the tax for all people with disa­bi­li­ties, of the type refer­red to by the appli­cant, would deny the very nature of the tax and would be incom­pa­ti­ble with the prin­ci­ple of equal tre­at­ment.
61. With regard to phy­si­cal disa­bi­li­ties, the Fede­ral Court found, in kee­ping with legal opi­ni­on in Switz­er­land, that the pro­hi­bi­ti­on of dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on should be limi­t­ed to people with disa­bi­li­ties of a cer­tain gra­vi­ty. The deci­ding factor was the risk of stig­ma­tis­a­ti­on, deni­gra­ti­on and social exclu­si­on becau­se of the disa­bi­li­ty. Accor­ding to the Govern­ment the Fede­ral Mili­ta­ry-Ser­vice Exemp­ti­on Tax Act made distinc­tions based on these prin­ci­ples. The obli­ga­ti­on to pay the exemp­ti­on tax did not apply to people with major disa­bi­li­ties, that is, pre­cis­e­ly those people who ran a risk of stig­ma­tis­a­ti­on. In the Government’s opi­ni­on the appli­cant ran no such risk as he was only slight­ly incon­ve­ni­en­ced in his ever­y­day life. In the normal course of things his disa­bi­li­ty was not even noti­ceable and there was no reason why anyone but a limi­t­ed circle of people should have known about it. The exemp­ti­on tax did not change that, as no-one but the person con­cer­ned knew about it. For people with more severe disa­bi­li­ties, on the other hand, espe­ci­al­ly cle­ar­ly visi­ble disa­bi­li­ties, spe­cial arran­ge­ments were jus­ti­fied, and exo­ne­ra­ting them from paying the tax was a means of not adding to the exclu­si­on they suf­fe­r­ed.
62. Accor­din­gly, the distinc­tion made bet­ween people unfit for mili­ta­ry ser­vice whose disa­bi­li­ty had only limi­t­ed reper­cus­sions on their working lives and those for whom it had more serious reper­cus­sions could not be said to be dis­cri­mi­na­to­ry. On the con­tra­ry, it was based on objec­ti­ve and reasonable con­side­ra­ti­ons.
63. As regards the instant case, the Govern­ment poin­ted out that the appli­cant suf­fe­r­ed from type 1 dia­be­tes. The table used by the Swiss Natio­nal Insu­rance Fund in the event of an acci­dent did not settle the ques­ti­on of whe­ther this dise­a­se should be con­side­red as a major disa­bi­li­ty within the mea­ning of sec­tion 4(1)(a) of the Fede­ral Mili­ta­ry-Ser­vice Exemp­ti­on Tax Act. Based on the medi­cal cer­ti­fi­ca­te drawn up by a dia­be­tes spe­cia­list from Zürich Uni­ver­si­ty Hos­pi­tal on 14 May 2002, the fede­ral tax aut­ho­ri­ties rated the applicant’s disa­bi­li­ty at less than 40%. This meant that it could not be con­side­red as a major disa­bi­li­ty for the pur­po­ses of the Act in ques­ti­on in so far as, alt­hough it made him unfit for mili­ta­ry ser­vice, it did not pre­vent him from working in various other capa­ci­ties.
64. In short, the Govern­ment con­side­red that the Swiss legis­la­ti­on was desi­gned to treat dif­fe­rent situa­tions dif­fer­ent­ly. The distinc­tions made in the law were based on objec­ti­ve and reasonable con­side­ra­ti­ons. In this par­ti­cu­lar case the Swiss aut­ho­ri­ties had cor­rect­ly appli­ed the law and could not, in the Government’s sub­mis­si­on, be con­side­red to have vio­la­ted Artic­le 14 of the Con­ven­ti­on. On the con­tra­ry, they argued, dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on much more serious than that which the appli­cant com­plai­ned of would have resul­ted had he been exempt­ed from paying the tax. It was true that a pos­si­ble dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on bet­ween people based on the serious­ness of their disa­bi­li­ty would be eli­mi­na­ted, but the result would be that wha­te­ver the reason for exemp­ting people from mili­ta­ry ser­vice, and in par­ti­cu­lar where they were found to be unfit, they would be under no obli­ga­ti­on to pay the exemp­ti­on tax. This in turn would amount to dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on against all those people who did do their com­pul­so­ry mili­ta­ry ser­vice.
(b) The appli­cant
65. The appli­cant dis­agreed with the Govern­ment. He argued that a person with a slight disa­bi­li­ty could con­ceiv­a­b­ly do civi­li­an ser­vice ins­tead, which was less phy­si­cal­ly and psy­cho­lo­gi­cal­ly deman­ding than mili­ta­ry ser­vice. It was dis­cri­mi­na­to­ry, he alle­ged, to allow con­sci­en­tious objec­tors to do sub­sti­tu­te ser­vice but not people declared unfit for mili­ta­ry ser­vice becau­se of a disa­bi­li­ty. In the cir­cum­s­tances, the appli­cant con­side­red that he had in fact been pena­li­sed – as he had suf­fe­r­ed a finan­cial loss – when in fact he had been pre­ven­ted against his will from doing his mili­ta­ry ser­vice and had not been allo­wed to do civi­li­an ser­vice ins­tead. In his opi­ni­on there was no valid jus­ti­fi­ca­ti­on for such dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on against people suf­fe­ring from minor disa­bi­li­ties com­pared with people who were allo­wed to freely choose, such as con­sci­en­tious objec­tors.
66. The appli­cant con­side­red it unfair that people with disa­bi­li­ties should be trea­ted dif­fer­ent­ly depen­ding on the level of disa­bi­li­ty, espe­ci­al­ly when the person con­cer­ned was wil­ling to do sub­sti­tu­te ser­vice, which would have entit­led him to an allo­wan­ce for loss of income. Fur­ther­mo­re, and con­tra­ry to what the Govern­ment had sub­mit­ted, the army had not con­side­red his disa­bi­li­ty to be a minor one, other­wi­se he would have been declared fit for ser­vice, with cer­tain rest­ric­tions for exam­p­le, or they would have assi­gned him to a unit less expo­sed to phy­si­cal effort.
67. Accor­ding to the appli­cant the Govern­ment had also failed to demons­tra­te that the 40% disa­bi­li­ty rate used to distin­gu­ish bet­ween people liable to pay the tax and those who were exempt was jus­ti­fied and not dis­cri­mi­na­to­ry. The appli­cant con­side­red that neither the law nor the case-law pro­vi­ded clear gui­dance. The decis­i­on not to exo­ne­ra­te him from paying the exemp­ti­on tax was based on the fact that his disa­bi­li­ty was less than 40%. That per­cen­ta­ge was based on a single pre­vious case con­cer­ning a person who had lost a leg – hardly a situa­ti­on com­pa­ra­ble to his own. It was the­r­e­fo­re a dis­cri­mi­na­to­ry decis­i­on.
68. Accor­ding to the appli­cant the dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on against people with minor disa­bi­li­ties could not be jus­ti­fied: it was neither fair nor in the public inte­rest. On the con­tra­ry, it was in the public inte­rest for these people to be included as much as pos­si­ble in normal life and not bur­den­ed with heavy, unfair finan­cial char­ges.
69. The appli­cant added that the pro­blems men­tio­ned were fur­ther aggrava­ted and appeared all the more dis­pro­por­tio­na­te becau­se people with disa­bi­li­ties did not usual­ly have very high inco­mes and the exemp­ti­on tax was not a pro­gres­si­ve tax.
70. Lastly, he poin­ted out that over the pre­vious fif­teen years the Swiss army had con­sider­a­b­ly redu­ced its num­bers, by more than 50% com­pared with 1989. A corol­la­ry of that decrease in num­bers was that an incre­asing number of men were being declared unfit for ser­vice. It was all too temp­ting, he argued, to decla­re men with minor disa­bi­li­ties unfit for ser­vice and make them pay the exemp­ti­on tax.
2. The Court’s assess­ment
(a) Appli­ca­ble prin­ci­ples
71. The Court rei­te­ra­tes that Artic­le 14 of the Con­ven­ti­on affords pro­tec­tion against dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on in the enjoy­ment of the rights and free­doms safe­guard­ed by the other sub­stan­ti­ve pro­vi­si­ons of the Con­ven­ti­on and its Pro­to­cols. Howe­ver, not every dif­fe­rence in tre­at­ment will amount to a vio­la­ti­on of this Artic­le. Ins­tead, it must be estab­lished that other per­sons in an ana­log­ous or rele­vant­ly simi­lar situa­ti­on enjoy pre­fe­ren­ti­al tre­at­ment, and that this distinc­tion is dis­cri­mi­na­to­ry (see, for exam­p­le, Natio­nal & Pro­vin­cial Buil­ding Socie­ty, Leeds Per­ma­nent Buil­ding Socie­ty and York­shire Buil­ding Socie­ty v. the United King­dom, 23 Octo­ber 1997, § 88, Reports 1997 VII, and Zarb Adami v. Malta, no. 17209/02, § 71, ECHR 2006-VIII).
72. Accor­ding to the Court’s case-law a dif­fe­rence of tre­at­ment is dis­cri­mi­na­to­ry within the mea­ning of Artic­le 14 if it has no objec­ti­ve and reasonable jus­ti­fi­ca­ti­on. The exis­tence of such a jus­ti­fi­ca­ti­on must be asses­sed in rela­ti­on to the aim and the effects of the mea­su­re con­cer­ned and the prin­ci­ples which nor­mal­ly pre­vail in demo­cra­tic socie­ties. A dif­fe­rence of tre­at­ment in the exer­cise of a right laid down by the Con­ven­ti­on must not only pursue a legi­ti­ma­te aim: Artic­le 14 will also be vio­la­ted when it is cle­ar­ly estab­lished that there is no reasonable rela­ti­onship of pro­por­tio­na­li­ty bet­ween the means employ­ed and the aim sought to be rea­li­sed (see, for exam­p­le, Zarb Adami, cited above, § 72; Stec and Others v. the United King­dom [GC], no. 65731/01, § 51, ECHR 2006-VI; Petro­vic, cited above, § 30; and Lith­gow and Others v. the United King­dom, 8 July 1986, § 177, Series A no. 102).
73. In other words, the notion of dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on includes, in gene­ral, cases where a person or group is trea­ted, wit­hout proper jus­ti­fi­ca­ti­on, less favour­a­b­ly than ano­ther, even though the more favoura­ble tre­at­ment is not called for by the Con­ven­ti­on (see Abdu­la­ziz, Caba­les and Balkan­da­li, cited above, § 82). Artic­le 14 does not pro­hi­bit distinc­tions in tre­at­ment which are foun­ded on an objec­ti­ve assess­ment of essen­ti­al­ly dif­fe­rent fac­tu­al cir­cum­s­tances and which, being based on the public inte­rest, strike a fair balan­ce bet­ween the pro­tec­tion of the inte­rests of the com­mu­ni­ty and respect for the rights and free­doms safe­guard­ed by the Con­ven­ti­on (see, among other aut­ho­ri­ties, G.M.B. and K.M. v. Switz­er­land (dec.), no. 36797/97, 27 Sep­tem­ber 2001, and Zarb Adami, cited above, § 73).
74. The Con­trac­ting States enjoy a cer­tain margin of app­re­cia­ti­on in asses­sing whe­ther and to what extent dif­fe­ren­ces in other­wi­se simi­lar situa­tions jus­ti­fy a dif­fe­rent tre­at­ment. The scope of the margin of app­re­cia­ti­on will vary accor­ding to the cir­cum­s­tances, the sub­ject matter and the back­ground (see Fretté v. France, no. 36515/97, § 40, ECHR 2002 I; Stec and Others, cited above, § 52; Ras­mus­sen v. Den­mark, 28 Novem­ber 1984, § 40, Series A no. 87; and Inze v. Aus­tria, 28 Octo­ber 1987, § 41, Series A no. 126).
75. Since the Con­ven­ti­on is first and fore­most a system for the pro­tec­tion of human rights, the Court must, howe­ver, have regard to the chan­ging con­di­ti­ons in Con­trac­ting States and respond, for exam­p­le, to any emer­ging con­sen­sus as to the stan­dards to be achie­ved. One of the rele­vant fac­tors in deter­mi­ning the scope of the margin of app­re­cia­ti­on left to the aut­ho­ri­ties may be the exis­tence or non-exis­tence of common ground bet­ween the laws of the Con­trac­ting States (see Ras­mus­sen, cited above, § 40, and, muta­tis mut­an­dis, The Sunday Times v. the United King­dom (no. 1), 26 April 1979, § 59, Series A no. 30).
76. The Con­ven­ti­on and its Pro­to­cols must be inter­pre­ted in the light of pre­sent-day con­di­ti­ons (see Tyrer v. the United King­dom, 25 April 1978, § 31, Series A no. 26; Airey v. Ire­land, 9 Octo­ber 1979, § 26, Series A no. 32; and Vo, cited above, § 82). Lastly, the Court rei­te­ra­tes the prin­ci­ple, well estab­lished in its case-law, that the Con­ven­ti­on is inten­ded to gua­ran­tee not rights that are theo­re­ti­cal or illu­so­ry but rights that are prac­ti­cal and effec­ti­ve (see, for exam­p­le, Artico v. Italy, 13 May 1980, § 33, Series A no. 37).
(b) Appli­ca­ti­on of these prin­ci­ples to the pre­sent case
(i) Whe­ther there was a dif­fe­rence of tre­at­ment bet­ween people in com­pa­ra­ble situa­tions
77. The appli­cant com­plai­ned that, having been con­side­red, under the legis­la­ti­on in force and the case-law of the Fede­ral Court, as having a minor disa­bi­li­ty, he was obli­ged, unlike people with more serious disa­bi­li­ties, to pay the mili­ta­ry-ser­vice exemp­ti­on tax, even though he had always expres­sed his wil­ling­ness to do mili­ta­ry ser­vice.
78. He also felt that he had been trea­ted in a dis­cri­mi­na­to­ry manner in so far as the sub­sti­tu­te civi­li­an ser­vice pro­vi­ded for under Swiss law, which would have exempt­ed him from paying the tax, was open only to con­sci­en­tious objec­tors.
79. The Court rei­te­ra­tes that the appli­cant did not do his mili­ta­ry ser­vice becau­se he was declared unfit by the com­pe­tent mili­ta­ry doctor. As a result, he was requi­red to pay the exemp­ti­on tax, like ever­yo­ne else in the same situa­ti­on, except for those with a major disa­bi­li­ty and those who did the sub­sti­tu­te civi­li­an ser­vice ins­tead. Howe­ver, only con­sci­en­tious objec­tors could opt for civi­li­an ins­tead of mili­ta­ry ser­vice. This is the situa­ti­on the appli­cant com­plai­ned of in the pre­sent appli­ca­ti­on.
80. The Court con­siders that this case pres­ents a dual exam­p­le of dif­fe­ren­ti­al tre­at­ment of people in com­pa­ra­ble situa­tions. As the list of grounds of distinc­tion given in Artic­le 14 is not exhaus­ti­ve (“or other status”; see Stec and Others, cited above, § 50), there is no doubt that the scope of this pro­vi­si­on includes dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on based on disa­bi­li­ty. It remains to be seen whe­ther the reasons for the dif­fe­rence of tre­at­ment were objec­ti­ve and reasonable.
(ii) Whe­ther there was objec­ti­ve and reasonable jus­ti­fi­ca­ti­on
(α) Objec­ti­ve jus­ti­fi­ca­ti­on
81. Accor­ding to the Govern­ment the distinc­tion pur­sued a legi­ti­ma­te aim, which was to re-estab­lish a sort of equa­li­ty bet­ween people who actual­ly did mili­ta­ry or civi­li­an ser­vice and those who were exempt­ed from it. The tax in ques­ti­on was meant to replace the efforts and obli­ga­ti­ons from which people exempt­ed from ser­ving were dis­pen­sed. The appli­cant dis­agreed.
82. The Court takes note of the aim of Swiss law to estab­lish a form of equa­li­ty bet­ween people who do their mili­ta­ry or civi­li­an ser­vice and those who are exempt­ed from it. It must the­r­e­fo­re con­sider whe­ther there is a reasonable rela­ti­onship of pro­por­tio­na­li­ty bet­ween the means employ­ed and the aim sought to be achie­ved. For this the Court must exami­ne whe­ther the Swiss aut­ho­ri­ties and courts struck a fair balan­ce bet­ween the pro­tec­tion of the inte­rests of the com­mu­ni­ty and respect for the applicant’s rights and free­doms safe­guard­ed by the Con­ven­ti­on.
(β) Reasonable jus­ti­fi­ca­ti­on
The margin of app­re­cia­ti­on affor­ded to the aut­ho­ri­ties
83. The Court obser­ves that Switz­er­land coll­ects a tax from all male citi­zens who are unable, for any reason, to do their com­pul­so­ry mili­ta­ry ser­vice and do not do the sub­sti­tu­te civi­li­an ser­vice ins­tead, with the excep­ti­on of those with a severe disa­bi­li­ty. While aware that this fact alone is not decisi­ve for its exami­na­ti­on of the com­plaint under Artic­le 14 of the Con­ven­ti­on, the Court notes that this type of tax, impo­sed even on men unfit for mili­ta­ry ser­vice becau­se of a phy­si­cal disa­bi­li­ty, does not seem to exist in other count­ries, at least in Europe (see para­graph 53 of the report of the United Nati­ons High Com­mis­sio­ner for Human Rights, and the obser­va­tions of the non-govern­men­tal orga­ni­sa­ti­on Con­sci­ence and Peace Tax Inter­na­tio­nal to the former Com­mis­si­on on Human Rights of the United Nati­ons Eco­no­mic and Social Coun­cil, para­graphs 38 and 39 above).
84. The Court also con­siders that obliging the appli­cant to pay the dis­pu­ted tax after deny­ing him the oppor­tu­ni­ty to do his mili­ta­ry (or civi­li­an) ser­vice might prove to be in con­tra­dic­tion with the need to pre­vent dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on against people with disa­bi­li­ties and foster their full par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on and inte­gra­ti­on in socie­ty. That being so, the margin of app­re­cia­ti­on the States enjoy in estab­li­shing dif­fe­rent legal tre­at­ment for people with disa­bi­li­ties is con­sider­a­b­ly redu­ced.
The inte­rests in issue
The public inte­rests of the respon­dent State
85. The Court then has to weigh up the inte­rests in issue. First of all, as regards the legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest of the Govern­ment in coll­ec­ting an exemp­ti­on tax, the Court notes at the outset that the only reason advan­ced by the Govern­ment for the legis­la­ti­on con­cer­ned is to main­tain a cer­tain equa­li­ty bet­ween people who do their mili­ta­ry or civi­li­an ser­vice and those who are exempt. In the instant case, howe­ver, the person con­cer­ned was declared unfit for ser­vice by the aut­ho­ri­ties even though he had always expres­sed his wil­ling­ness to serve. In such a situa­ti­on the Court is not con­vin­ced that it is in the inte­rest of the com­mu­ni­ty to oblige the man to pay a tax to com­pen­sa­te for not having done his mili­ta­ry ser­vice. The Court does not con­sider that the finan­cial con­tri­bu­ti­on in ques­ti­on in this case serves any important com­pen­sa­to­ry pur­po­se (see, muta­tis mut­an­dis, Karl­heinz Schmidt v. Ger­ma­ny, 18 July 1994, § 28, Series A no. 291 B).
86. In view, inter alia, of the staff reduc­tions in the Swiss army in recent years (see para­graph 40 above; see also, for exam­p­le, the Fede­ral Council’s report of 7 June 1999 to the Fede­ral Assem­bly on Switzerland’s secu­ri­ty policy, pp. 58 and 70), the Court also con­siders that the tax has no major deter­rent role to play either. Cle­ar­ly it does not serve to ensure that a suf­fi­ci­ent number of people do their mili­ta­ry ser­vice, as at the mate­ri­al time there were plenty of people ready and able to do mili­ta­ry ser­vice. The Court also obser­ves the recent ten­den­cy for Euro­pean States to do away with con­scrip­ti­on altog­e­ther in favour of regu­lar armies (for exam­p­le, Spain (2002), Por­tu­gal (2004), Hun­ga­ry and the Czech Repu­blic (2005), Bosnia and Her­ze­go­vina and Slo­va­kia (2006), and Roma­nia, Italy and Latvia (2007)). The need to gua­ran­tee the country’s defence and secu­ri­ty by means of the tax is the­r­e­fo­re not really estab­lished.
87. On the other hand, in the light of the figu­res sup­pli­ed by the par­ties (see para­graphs 41–43 above), it appears that over 40% of all men were even­tual­ly declared unfit for mili­ta­ry ser­vice in recent years. Accor­ding to the infor­ma­ti­on in the Court’s pos­ses­si­on, the per­cen­ta­ge of people recei­ving disa­bi­li­ty bene­fits was small at the rele­vant time and a large majo­ri­ty of those per­sons declared unfit for ser­vice were obli­ged to pay the exemp­ti­on tax. The Court accor­din­gly con­siders it likely that the reve­nue gene­ra­ted by the exemp­ti­on tax is not negli­gi­ble.
The applicant’s per­so­nal inte­rest
88. The Govern­ment sug­gested that the tax did not place a sub­stan­ti­al finan­cial burden on people with less than 40% disa­bi­li­ty.
89. The Court obser­ves that the exemp­ti­on tax the appli­cant was requi­red to pay for the year 2000 amoun­ted to CHF 716 (appro­xi­m­ate­ly EUR 477). While it is true that this sum repres­ents only 2% of the applicant’s salary, it cannot be said to be insi­gni­fi­cant con­side­ring the rela­tively modest level of his taxa­ble income. Fur­ther­mo­re, it must be borne in mind that the tax in ques­ti­on is levied every year, for as long as the mili­ta­ry obli­ga­ti­ons last, that is to say, from the person’s 20th to the end of their 30th or even their 34th year (see para­graphs 28 and 31 above). That being so, the Court cannot con­sider the finan­cial inci­dence of the tax on the appli­cant to be merely sym­bo­lic.
How the aut­ho­ri­ties asses­sed the applicant’s disa­bi­li­ty level and the amount of the exemp­ti­on tax
90. The other factor to be taken into account is the applicant’s disa­bi­li­ty, which led the com­pe­tent aut­ho­ri­ties to decla­re him unfit for mili­ta­ry ser­vice. In cal­cu­la­ting the tax to be paid, Swiss law takes into account the degree of disa­bi­li­ty, exemp­ting those per­sons who suffer from major disa­bi­li­ties. The Fede­ral Court has defi­ned the mea­ning of a “major” disa­bi­li­ty. In a 1998 judgment it ruled that it should be unders­tood in the medi­cal sense, not the disa­bi­li­ty insu­rance sense. It held that the disa­bi­li­ty caused by ampu­ta­ti­on of the leg at the knee was a “major” disa­bi­li­ty, cor­re­spon­ding to 40% on the disa­bi­li­ty scale (see para­graph 33 above). In a judgment of 2000, the Fede­ral Court deci­ded that what should be taken into con­side­ra­ti­on were the tables used by the Swiss Natio­nal Insu­rance Fund, in the event of an acci­dent, to cal­cu­la­te com­pen­sa­ti­on for bodily harm in accordance with the fede­ral law on acci­dent insu­rance. Accor­ding to the Govern­ment, the inten­ti­on behind sec­tion 4(1)(a) of the Fede­ral Mili­ta­ry-Ser­vice Exemp­ti­on Tax Act was appar­ent­ly not to gene­ral­ly exempt people with minor disa­bi­li­ties – and the­r­e­fo­re capa­ble of working and ear­ning a normal salary – from the obli­ga­ti­on to pay the tax.
91. The Court is well aware that it is in the first place for the natio­nal aut­ho­ri­ties, nota­b­ly the courts, to inter­pret and apply the dome­stic law (see Win­ter­werp v. the Net­her­lands, 24 Octo­ber 1979, § 46, Series A no. 33). It nevert­hel­ess con­siders that the manner in which the rele­vant dome­stic aut­ho­ri­ties pro­cee­ded in the pre­sent case was ques­tionable. First of all they simply com­pared the applicant’s ill­ness – which did not pre­vent him from working – with the case of a person whose leg had been ampu­ta­ted fol­lo­wing an acci­dent, and con­cluded that his disa­bi­li­ty was a minor one becau­se it did not attain the 40% thres­hold. In the Court’s opi­ni­on, in taking only one cri­ter­ion into con­side­ra­ti­on, based on a pre­ce­dent which scar­ce­ly bore com­pa­ri­son, the Swiss aut­ho­ri­ties failed to give suf­fi­ci­ent con­side­ra­ti­on to the applicant’s indi­vi­du­al situa­ti­on.
92. The second, sub­si­dia­ry, cri­ter­ion in sec­tion 4(1)(a) of the Fede­ral Mili­ta­ry-Ser­vice Exemp­ti­on Tax Act is the applicant’s income. Once his disa­bi­li­ty had been declared to be a minor disa­bi­li­ty, the appli­cant had no pos­si­bi­li­ty of chal­len­ging the pre­sump­ti­on – based on that pro­vi­si­on and on the above-men­tio­ned case-law of the Fede­ral Court – that a person with only a minor disa­bi­li­ty was not placed at a dis­ad­van­ta­ge in the working world. In other words, the appli­cant could not claim that his income was rela­tively modest and that, accor­din­gly, the obli­ga­ti­on to pay the exemp­ti­on tax was dis­pro­por­tio­na­te in his case.
93. Lastly, the Court notes the lack of any pos­si­bi­li­ty of exemp­ti­on from the tax in issue for those whose disa­bi­li­ty was con­side­red to be less than 40% but who, like the appli­cant, had a rela­tively modest salary. On the con­tra­ry, the law fixed a mini­mum pay­ment of CHF 200 per year (see para­graph 32 above). As a result, even people whose annual income was not high enough for them to pay income tax were not exempt­ed from paying the tax in issue here.
The lack of alter­na­ti­ves to the tax
94. The Court con­siders that in order for a mea­su­re to be con­side­red pro­por­tio­na­te and neces­sa­ry in a demo­cra­tic socie­ty, there must be no other means of achie­ving the same end that would inter­fe­re less serious­ly with the fun­da­men­tal right con­cer­ned. In this regard the Court notes that the appli­cant always expres­sed his wil­ling­ness to do his mili­ta­ry ser­vice but that he was declared unfit for ser­vice by the mili­ta­ry doctor. Accor­ding to the Govern­ment, that fin­ding was based on the fact that he had to give hims­elf an insu­lin injec­tion four times a day. The Court is fully aware that where the orga­ni­sa­ti­on and ope­ra­tio­nal effec­ti­ve­ness of the armed forces are con­cer­ned the States enjoy a cer­tain margin of app­re­cia­ti­on (see, muta­tis mut­an­dis, Smith and Grady v. the United King­dom, nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, § 89, ECHR 1999 VI). It nevert­hel­ess won­ders what pre­ven­ted the aut­ho­ri­ties from set­ting in place spe­cial forms of ser­vice for people in a situa­ti­on com­pa­ra­ble to that of the appli­cant. For exam­p­le, acti­vi­ties which, alt­hough car­ri­ed out within the armed forces, requi­red less phy­si­cal effort and could the­r­e­fo­re be per­for­med by people like the appli­cant. In cer­tain States the law pro­vi­des for alter­na­ti­ve forms of mili­ta­ry ser­vice, in the armed forces, for people with par­ti­al disa­bi­li­ties. In prac­ti­ce these people are recrui­ted to posts suited to their degree of disa­bi­li­ty and their occu­pa­tio­nal skills.
95. It is not in dis­pu­te that the appli­cant was also wil­ling to do the sub­sti­tu­te civi­li­an ser­vice ins­tead of mili­ta­ry ser­vice. Under Swiss law, howe­ver, that option is open only to con­sci­en­tious objec­tors, based on the idea that civi­li­an ser­vice requi­res the same phy­si­cal and mental qua­li­ties as mili­ta­ry ser­vice. The Court cannot accept that argu­ment. It is true that in a large majo­ri­ty of the States sub­sti­tu­te ser­vice is open only to con­sci­en­tious objec­tors, as it is in Switz­er­land (for the Swe­dish approach, which appears to be an excep­ti­on, see para­graph 34 of the report by the Com­mit­tee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Par­lia­men­ta­ry Assem­bly of the Coun­cil of Europe entit­led “Exer­cise of the right of con­sci­en­tious objec­tion to mili­ta­ry ser­vice in Coun­cil of Europe member States”, 4 May 2001, Doc. 8809 revi­sed, available on the Inter­net). The Court is con­vin­ced, howe­ver, that spe­cial forms of civi­li­an ser­vice tail­o­red to the needs of people in the applicant’s situa­ti­on are per­fect­ly envi­sa­geable (for the wide range of sub­sti­tu­te ser­vices out­side the armed forces open to con­sci­en­tious objec­tors, see, muta­tis mut­an­dis, para­graph 35 of the above-men­tio­ned Par­lia­men­ta­ry Assem­bly report, and para­graphs 43–46 of the report of the Office of the United Nati­ons High Com­mis­sio­ner for Human Rights, men­tio­ned in para­graph 38 above).
Con­clu­si­on
96. In con­clu­si­on, the Court con­siders that in the pre­sent case the dome­stic aut­ho­ri­ties failed to strike a fair balan­ce bet­ween the pro­tec­tion of the inte­rests of the com­mu­ni­ty and respect for the Con­ven­ti­on rights and free­doms of the appli­cant, who was not allo­wed to do his mili­ta­ry ser­vice, or civi­li­an ser­vice ins­tead, but was nevert­hel­ess requi­red to pay the exemp­ti­on tax. It takes into account the par­ti­cu­lar cir­cum­s­tances of the case, inclu­ding: the amount paya­ble – which was not a negli­gi­ble sum for the appli­cant – and the number of years over which it was char­ged; the fact that the appli­cant was wil­ling to do mili­ta­ry or civi­li­an ser­vice; the lack of pro­vi­si­on under Swiss law for forms of ser­vice sui­ta­ble for people in the applicant’s situa­ti­on, and the minor role the tax plays nowa­days in terms of pre­ven­ting or com­pen­sa­ting for the avo­id­ance of com­pul­so­ry natio­nal ser­vice.
97. In the light of the aim and the effects of the tax in ques­ti­on, the objec­ti­ve reasons given to jus­ti­fy the distinc­tion made by the dome­stic aut­ho­ri­ties, nota­b­ly bet­ween people declared unfit for ser­vice and exo­ne­ra­ted from paying the tax and those declared unfit for ser­vice but nevert­hel­ess obli­ged to pay it, do not appear reasonable in rela­ti­on to the prin­ci­ples which nor­mal­ly pre­vail in demo­cra­tic socie­ties.
98. That being so, the appli­cant has been the victim of dis­cri­mi­na­to­ry tre­at­ment and there has been a vio­la­ti­on of Artic­le 14 of the Con­ven­ti­on taken in con­junc­tion with Artic­le 8.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7 OF THE CONVENTION
99. Rely­ing on Artic­le 7 of the Con­ven­ti­on, the appli­cant alle­ged that that the decis­i­on of the Swiss aut­ho­ri­ties to set the degree of disa­bi­li­ty requi­red for exo­ne­ra­ti­on from the mili­ta­ry-ser­vice exemp­ti­on tax at 40% had no basis in law.
100. The Court con­siders that the impug­ned decis­i­on does not fall within the scope of that pro­vi­si­on ratio­ne mate­riae, in so far as no “penal­ty” within the mea­ning of Artic­le 7 § 1 of the Con­ven­ti­on was impo­sed on the appli­cant (see, for exam­p­le, Welch v. the United King­dom, 9 Febru­ary 1995, §§ 26–36, Series A no. 307 A, and Jamil v. France, 8 June 1995, §§ 26–33, Series A no. 317 B).
101. It fol­lows that this com­plaint must be rejec­ted as mani­fest­ly ill-foun­ded, pur­su­ant to Artic­le 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Con­ven­ti­on.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
102. Artic­le 41 of the Con­ven­ti­on pro­vi­des:
“If the Court finds that there has been a vio­la­ti­on of the Con­ven­ti­on or the Pro­to­cols the­re­to, and if the inter­nal law of the High Con­trac­ting Party con­cer­ned allows only par­ti­al repa­ra­ti­on to be made, the Court shall, if neces­sa­ry, afford just satis­fac­tion to the inju­red party.”
A. Damage
103. The Court notes that the appli­cant sub­mit­ted no claim in respect of pecu­nia­ry or non-pecu­nia­ry damage.
B. Costs and expen­ses
104. The applicant’s coun­sel clai­med a total of 12,256.70 Swiss francs (CHF) (appro­xi­m­ate­ly 8,171 euros (EUR)) for the costs and expen­ses incur­red before the Court.
105. The Govern­ment poin­ted out that the appli­cant had been repre­sen­ted by coun­sel only at an advan­ced stage of the pro­cee­dings, and that the pro­cee­dings had raised no par­ti­cu­lar­ly com­plex legal issues. They accor­din­gly con­side­red that an award of CHF 2,000 (appro­xi­m­ate­ly EUR 1,333) for costs and expen­ses would be fair.
106. Accor­ding to the Court’s case-law, an appli­cant is entit­led to the reim­bur­se­ment of costs and expen­ses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actual­ly and neces­s­a­ri­ly incur­red and are reasonable as to quan­tum. In the pre­sent case, regard being had to the docu­ments in its pos­ses­si­on and the above cri­te­ria, the Court con­siders it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 4,500 for the pro­cee­dings before the Court.
107. Con­se­quent­ly, after deduc­tion of the sum of EUR 850 which he has alre­a­dy recei­ved in legal aid for the pro­cee­dings before it, the Court awards the appli­cant the sum of EUR 3,650 for costs and expen­ses, plus any tax that may be char­geable to the appli­cant on that amount.
C. Default inte­rest
108. The Court con­siders it appro­pria­te that the default inte­rest rate should be based on the mar­gi­nal len­ding rate of the Euro­pean Cen­tral Bank, to which should be added three per­cen­ta­ge points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Decla­res the com­plaint con­cer­ning Artic­le 14 of the Con­ven­ti­on taken in con­junc­tion with Artic­le 8 admis­si­ble and the rema­in­der of the appli­ca­ti­on inad­mis­si­ble;

2. Holds that there has been a vio­la­ti­on of Artic­le 14 of the Con­ven­ti­on taken in con­junc­tion with Artic­le 8;

3. Holds
(a) that the respon­dent State is to pay the appli­cant, within three months from the date on which the judgment beco­mes final in accordance with Artic­le 44 § 2 of the Con­ven­ti­on, EUR 3,650 (three thousand six hundred and fifty euros), plus any tax that may be char­geable to the appli­cant, in respect of costs and expen­ses, to be con­ver­ted into the cur­ren­cy of the respon­dent State at the rate appli­ca­ble at the date of sett­le­ment;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-men­tio­ned three months until sett­le­ment simple inte­rest shall be paya­ble on the above amount at a rate equal to the mar­gi­nal len­ding rate of the Euro­pean Cen­tral Bank during the default period plus three per­cen­ta­ge points;

4. Dis­mis­ses the rema­in­der of the applicant’s claim for just satis­fac­tion.
Done in Eng­lish, and noti­fied in wri­ting on 30 April 2009, pur­su­ant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.